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We discuss three learning rules for generalized Bayesian updating of an imprecise proba-
bility: (a modiﬁed version of) the generalized Bayes’ rule, the maximum likelihood update
rule (after Gilboa and Schmeidler) and a newly developed hybrid rule. We investigate the
general methodology for a special class of multivariate probability measures with pre-
scribed marginals but arbitrary correlation structure. Both the choice and analysis of this
class are motivated by expert interviews that we conducted with modelers in the ﬁeld
of climatic change.
We argue that both updating rules from the literature have strong limitations, the general-
ized Bayes’ rule is too conservative, i.e., too inclusive, while the maximum likelihood
update rule being too exclusive, adding spurious information. As a powerful extension
we introduce a new rule for Bayesian updating of an imprecise measure: a ‘‘weighted like-
lihood update method,” which bases Bayesian updating on the whole set of priors but
weights the inﬂuence of its members. We study the different rules in the case of bivariate
Gaussian priors. Our investigation shows that the new rule combines certain attractive fea-
tures of the generalized Bayes’ rule and the maximum likelihood update rule. In this article
we aim at highlighting the sequence of not yet fully resolved statistical issues a practitioner
on complex mechanistic models would face when updating imprecise prior knowledge.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction and background
Imprecise probability [12,15,45,47,49,50] provides a means to express ambiguity (non-stochastic uncertainty) in an
appropriate way and is equally a powerful methodology for generalizing the classical calculus of probability to handle the
multi-dimensional nature of uncertainty [30, p. 1], which in particular arises when expert opinions have to be modeled.
The most common – closely related – mathematical tools are non-additive set functions and sets of classical probabilities.
We rely strictly on the latter throughout this paper.. All rights reserved.
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Since expert opinions are typically to be understood as a sort of generalized subjective prior probability, it is a natural aim
to generalize the classical Bayesian approach of learning. The latter utilizes Bayes’ theorem to update prior knowledge, for-
mulated by prior probabilities over parameters, in the light of data to obtain posterior probabilities on the parameters, which
then completely describe the state of knowledge after having seen the data.
One way to extend this learning scheme to imprecise probabilities represented by sets of prior probabilities suggests it-
self: the element-by-element approach, where each precise prior is updated to the corresponding posterior, and then the
whole set of posterior probabilities is used for the subsequent analysis. This way to proceed seems to be self-evident for
most robust Bayesians (e.g., [38]). Moreover it can be corroborated by strong internal consistency arguments: Walley
[45] neatly justiﬁes his closely related generalized Bayes rule (abbreviated as GBR-W hereafter) by deriving it from general
coherence axioms within his framework. Consequently GBR-W has become one of the central tools in the theory of impre-
cise probability.
However, one has to be aware that frequentist and decision theoretic optimality properties inherent in the classical
Bayesian approach do not extend to the imprecise probability setting, in particular decision functions derived from the
GBR-W are not risk-minimizing in data-based decision problems [1].
The main reservation towards the practical use of GBR-W, however, comes from the applied point of view: The range of
the resulting posterior probabilities may turn out to be quite large, and sometimes even too large to allow for any statement
that is non-trivial from the practical point of view. This is a very subtle issue, since a wide posterior range is not always unde-
sirable: [45, p. 5] explicitly names the possibility to recognize prior-data conﬂict in wide posterior intervals as one of the
main motivations for imprecise probabilities, and [40] give even arguments in favor of the possibility of the phenomenon
of dilation, where imprecision increases irrespective of the data. On the other hand, for instance in climate modeling, almost
vacuous posterior intervals are often counter-intuitive, and are then perceived as simple mathematical artefacts resulting
from ‘‘extreme priors” that are contained in the prior class for the sake of simplicity of mathematical treatment, but without
any meaning from the substantive point of view. In those situations it is highly desirable to exclude such ‘‘meaningless pri-
ors” from the analysis. A ﬁrst step towards this aim is to add some qualitative restrictions to the original class, ﬁltering out
priors of extreme shape that usually do not ﬁt to any expert’s judgment. There is a long list of possible restrictions available
in the context of robust Bayesian analysis (see, e.g., the models applied in [38]); we will later on explicitly apply a gradient
ﬁlter, which was also used in [46].
Another, much more fundamental, way of avoiding near vacuous posterior conclusions is a so-to-say dynamic revision of
the underlying set of probabilities in the sense that the observed data are used for weighting the prior opinions. In practical
terms this can be interpreted as the fact that after having seen the data some prior expert opinions appear to be less reliable
than others; from the theoretical standpoint this means nothing less than the search for alternative learning rules. Walley
himself sees plenty of room for discussion,1 but only few alternative rules have been studied so far. These rare exceptions in-
clude [41], reﬁning priors in the light of the data, [10,11], developing an updating procedure driven by an information measure,
Gilboa’s and Schmeidler’s [26] maximum likelihood updating, which restricts consideration to those priors which will have fore-
seen the observations with highest predictive prior probability (see also [48, Appendix] for an argument in that direction), and a
quantile-based selection of priors [27].
We will depart from the maximum likelihood updating method that is closely related to Dempster’s rule of conditioning
[16], and so, in this vein, any other rule of conditioning could be used (see [52] for different types of conditioning in Demp-
ster–Shafer theory, and also [19,51]) in principle, as long as one still relies on the implicit Bayesian dogma that updating is
best done by conditioning.2 Moreover, note that there is also a close relationship to more traditional Bayesian statistics. In
terms of [4, p. 99] every such prior is a type II maximum likelihood prior, and so an imprecise posterior derived from the max-
imum likelihood update method can be interpreted as the envelope of all the posteriors arising from type II maximum likeli-
hood priors.3
In investigating the maximum likelihood update rule, we gain the impression that it is excessively prone to adding spu-
rious information in an overoptimistic way. As a compromise we suggest a new hybrid rule, called weighted likelihood update
rule, that weights the original elements of the prior in a data-dependent way, linearly: We divide the set of priors into dif-
ferent strata according to their predictive power related to the data, and deﬁne the posterior interval as the weighted sum of
the posterior intervals corresponding to those strata.41 Walley [45, p. 335] notes that although ‘‘the earlier theory of coherence suggests that [. . .the GBR-W] is a reasonable updating strategy, [. . .] there is nothing
in the theory that requires You to follow either” the construction of conditional previsions through the GBR-W or the adoption of the resulting conditional
prevision as the updated prevision. He also stresses (c.f. [45, p. 334]) that ‘‘there is a role for other updating strategies, not because the updated beliefs
constructed through the GBR-W are unjustiﬁed, but because they are often indeterminate” and gives a list of twelve items (cf. [45, Chapter 6.11.1])
summarizing ‘‘[. . .] the reasons for which the GBR-W may fail to be applicable or useful as an updating strategy”.
2 [2, Section 1] stress that, at least in the predictive setting considered there, conditioning and updating have to be well distinguished.
3 This point of view could be very helpful for practical computations, since there are techniques based on the EM-algorithm available for calculating type II
maximum likelihood priors, e.g., [4, p. 100].
4 In the light of the concept of type II maximum likelihood an alternative approach to reﬁne the prior should again be brieﬂy mentioned here: [14] consider
conditional C-minimaxity actions among the set of all priors ‘‘close” to the type II maximum likelihood prior.
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Here we investigate three different ways of Bayesian updating (pointwise updating of the prior class, closely related to
GBR-W, maximum likelihood and weighted likelihood updating) for a particular imprecise probability model. The model
is described by a class of multivariate probabilities with prescribed marginals. It shall represent epistemic uncertainty on
a multi-dimensional parameter space where an expert is able to specify any of the marginals in terms of probability mea-
sures, but refuses to deliver any further information, in particular not on the correlation structure among the parameters.
A couple of authors have investigated such classes [6,17,22,27,32–34,42]. Some of the properties of those classes are also
resembled by the multivariate possibility measure [18] introduced in [29]. For that possibility measure, instead of an explicit
correlation structure, [29] prescribe spherical symmetry in a rather heuristic manner.
However this article goes one step further and compares posterior properties of the class with prescribed marginals for
the competing updating rules generalizing Bayesian inference. This distinguishes it from earlier analyses, e.g., [32], who
investigate posterior properties derived from the generalized Bayes rule only.
Our interest in the class of prior probabilities with prescribed marginals arose when we observed that climate model
developers or users frequently claimed a lot of knowledge on individual model parameters related to speciﬁc physical pro-
cesses, but felt much less able to give any prior knowledge on the way the parameters must interact in order to obtain a
reasonable model climate state. The situation is similar for other models used in the climatic change assessment. We based
our impression on more objective grounds by distributing a questionnaire to half a dozen model users (see Section 3.1). In
this paper, we would like to analyze the implications of the apparent difference in availability of ‘‘knowledge on marginals”
versus ‘‘knowledge on correlations” and choose a precise probability measure for the marginals and complete ignorance
about the correlation structure.
It is our impression that an investigation of this type is desperately needed as in the climate modeling community – as
well as in many other research communities – the issue of prior knowledge on parameter correlations is one of the most
neglected issues, typically being represented in a naive way by uncorrelated measures. The situation is different as far as
univariate uncertainties about single parameters are concerned. There are examples in the literature that include something
close to robust Bayesian analysis in a rudimentary manner (in [21] two sorts of priors are investigated) or even explicit treat-
ment in terms of probability ratio models [43] or probability boxes [31].
However, the frequently made silent assumption that an expert uninformed about correlations is best represented by
uncorrelated parameters, seems to us to mimic the ‘‘objective Bayesians”’ assumption that the situation of complete igno-
rance on a single parameter is best represented by a non-informative prior. We follow the quite contrary assumption of Wal-
ley [45, Chapter 5.5] that there is no such thing as non-informative priors and that situations of ignorance must be captured
by imprecise models.5 Therefore we proceed in setting up an imprecise model for correlations.
While a class of priors with prescribed marginals seems to be what follows directly from the interviews with experts, [34,
Section 3.3] calls the imprecise posterior (after updating with GBR-W) of such classes ‘‘useless” (i.e., almost non-informa-
tive). In [34, Section 3.3] a contamination class is suggested instead that is a superposition of a precise prior and the class
of vacuous correlation structure we would like to investigate here. So the posterior is made more informative by returning
to an ‘‘almost precise” prior. On the contrary we ﬁnd it more convincing to exclude the most bizarre elements of the original
class (Section 2.3) and to search for alternative updating rules (Section 2.1).
It is apparent that the prior correlation structure will have a strong inﬂuence on the result of generalized Bayesian
updating, in particular in high dimensions. For example, for a non-informative likelihood and identical Gaussian margin-
als, the standard deviation of the posterior will scale with  ﬃﬃﬃnp for the uncorrelated case, but with n for the perfectly
correlated case (n denoting the number of parameters). This article highlights the interplay of such effects with the
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion as manifest in the different updating rules, for the analytically most transparent
cases. Finally, one could ask what the effects of imperfections in the elicited prior were, and add another layer of uncer-
tainty in the sense of robust Bayesian analysis [4]. However, such analysis is clearly beyond the scope of this article.
Here we would like to study the consequences of the main imprecision in the prior as elicited under the three updating
rules.
In more detail, the present article is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the general development and discus-
sion of learning rules. We start with two prominent generalizations of Bayes’ formula for imprecise priors, then introduce
a new generalization and also make some suggestions on how to deal with overly inclusive prior classes. We then inves-
tigate the learning rules in more detail in a special situation. Section 3 describes the underlying prior model, including our
expert elicitation motivating it. The results are presented in Section 4. The newly introduced weighted likelihood updating
rule appears as more convincing than the overly exclusive maximum likelihood update rule proposed by Gilboa and
Schmeidler, while at the same time it generates much more conclusive statements than can be inferred from the very con-
servative GBR, a modiﬁed version of GBR-W. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize our results and outline needs for future
work.5 A bit more ﬂexibility is achieved by specifying copulas [35], to which, however, similar counter-arguments also apply, since the dependence structure is
still speciﬁed more precisely than can be derived honestly.
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In this section we start with the basic form of three updating rules and then discuss several ways to reduce overly inclu-
sive prior sets. All the rules generalize traditional Bayesian learning (updating) on a possibly vector-valued parameter x from
data y, given a single prior probability measure P, by Bayes’ rule:6 One
type II m
such a dPpost;yðxÞ ¼ PðxÞLyðxÞR dx0Pðx0ÞLyðx0Þ : ð1Þ
In this formula we require that x assumes values of a continuous random variable (i.e., has a density with respect to the
Lebesgue measure) and 0 <
R
dx0Pðx0Þ  Lyðx0Þ <1, as we will assume silently throughout the rest of the paper. Ly(x)  P(yjx)
denotes the likelihood function for the uncertain (multivariate) parameter x. Note further that here and later in the paper we
use ‘‘P” synonymously for the probability measure as well as for the accompanying density when applied to absolutely con-
tinuous probability distributions on Rn.
2.1. Updating rules
However, since in our situation we have a class of priors rather than a single prior, Eq. (1) cannot directly be applied in the
traditional way, and we have to specify appropriate generalizations. In the following we outline types of generalizations of
Bayes’ formula we will employ when updating a class of priors P rather than a single prior P. We brieﬂy summarize two
update rules discussed in the literature, the generalized Bayes rule (GBR) (within this article a straightforwardly modiﬁed ver-
sion of the generalized Bayes rule GBR-W for convex sets of probabilities [45, Chapter 8.4.8] is used) and the maximum like-
lihood update rule (after [26]). As a third option we will introduce theweighted likelihood update rule that includes elements of
both of the former rules.
The three updating rules work as follows:
2.1.1. GBR(1) In view of evidence y, any element of the class of priors P is updated according to (standard) Bayes’ rule (1).
(2) The probability of interest (e.g., of crossing a certain threshold, in our application the probability of ruin, Eq. (7) below)
is extracted from all of the posteriors.
(3) The inf- and sup-operations are applied to ﬁnd the lower and upper probability of interest. Thereby an interval, for
instance, of probabilities of ruin is created.
As discussed in the Introduction, this rule is standard procedure in robust Bayesian inference (e.g., [5], (3) making up the
so called ‘‘posterior imprecision” [34, Section 3.1]) and in the behavioral approach to imprecise probability initiated by Wal-
ley [45], who also justiﬁes this way of updating by deriving it from a list of coherence axioms. In the following we will use the
term ‘‘GBR” not only for updating ofP but also as a module in other learning rules where the above three steps are applied to
subsets of P.
2.1.2. Maximum likelihood update rule [26](1) The subset of P is determined that contains all those priors that optimize the predictive prior probability (density) for
the measurement y, i.e.:PML;y :¼ argmax P 2 P
Z dx0Pðx0ÞLyðx0Þ
 
:(2) GBR is applied to this subset.
The method completely disregards expert opinions that have not foreseen the measurement y with maximum probabil-
ity. Gilboa and Schmeidler [26] showed that the maximum likelihood update method coincides with a generalized version of
Dempster’s rule of conditioning [16] (to arbitrary coherent lower probabilities) if the lower probability on the joint space
X  Y of possible parameters and observations is 2-monotone. Although it is not unrealistic to discount expert opinions6 that
are at odds with observations, we ﬁnd it unconvincing to dismiss completely opinions just because they have not foreseen the
measurement with maximum probability. In particular, our discomfort refers to the exclusion of those opinions that have
missed the maximum by just an inﬁnitesimal amount.criticism of this method points to the fact that the evidence is used twice – ﬁrst for selection of priors, then for GBR. In this context the connection to
aximum likelihood methods mentioned in the Introduction is helpful. It relates the procedure to empirical Bayes methods (e.g., [4, Section 4.5]), where
ouble use of data has been justiﬁed and is widely accepted. Further discussions of this point will follow in footnote 9 and in the concluding Section.
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For that reason, we introduce an extension of the maximum likelihood update method, theweighted likelihood update rule.
On the one hand, we require that any of the prior opinions is considered in the updating process, a property shared with GBR,
and on the other hand, as in the maximum likelihood update rule, that the predictive power of each element ofP should play
a role. Our new method involves the following steps:
(1) We decompose P in terms of level sets with respect to prior probability of y (Eqs. (3)–(5) below).
(2) We apply GBR to each level set.
(3) We average over GBR results while we linearly weight with respect to the prior predictive probability density of y.7
For a technical deﬁnition of our new method let for the moment P be of ﬁnite cardinality I, i.e., P ¼ fP1; . . . ; PIg. Let
Wy : P! Rþ0 denote the probability of y for any prior P, i.e., for given y7 Alte
weight.
8 The
stateme
self-con
9 Thi
twice w
and Sch8P2P WyðPÞ :¼
Z
dx PðxÞLyðxÞ ¼
Z
dx PðxÞPðy j xÞ; ð2Þassuming that for all P 2 P the relation R dx PðxÞLðxÞ <1 holds.
Let fw1;y; . . . ;wJ;yg :¼ WðPÞ; J 6 I be the set of weights generated fromP, i.e., the prior probabilities of the evidence y, and
Ppost;yðPÞ the posterior probability of the quantity of interest, given the prior P 2 P. Based on
Pj;y :¼ fP 2 P jWyðPÞ ¼ wj;yg; j ¼ 1; . . . ; J; ð3Þwe deﬁnePpost:wm;y :¼
PJ
j¼1wj;y  infP2Pj;yðP

post;yðPÞÞPJ
j¼1wj;y
; ð4Þ
Ppost:wm;y :¼
PJ
j¼1wj;y  sup
P2Pj;y
ðPpost;yðPÞÞPJ
j¼1wj;y
; ð5Þassuming
PJ
j¼1wj;y > 0. This new method would reveal results identical to those obtained from the maximum likelihood up-
date if w1,y 6¼ 0, w2,y, . . . ,wJ,y = 0. Furthermore, ifWy is injective, the weighted likelihood update rule (WLU) reduces to precise
Bayesian updating with j as a hyperparameter and equal prior weight assigned to all elements ofP. The latter has been intro-
duced in [39] and analyzed in [3] within the context of combining the posteriors from different experts.8
In Section 4.5.2 we extendWLU to aP of inﬁnite cardinality. IfP is integrable with respect toW and in the special caseWy
is injective (which is not the case for the example in Section 4.5.2), WLU delivers the measure in the hyperparameter for
precise Bayesian updating, in assuming W as uniformly distributed.9
Being lower and upper envelopes of set of precise probabilities, the lower and upper posterior probabilities derived from
the maximum likelihood updating rule and the weighted maximum likelihood update rule are still separately coherent in the
sense of [45, Def. 6.2.2], but they fail to satisfy the stronger condition of being coherent to the unconditonal prior probabil-
ities in the sense of [45, Section 6.3], since they do not obey the generalized Bayes rule, which can be derived from that stron-
ger type of coherence (see [45, p. 296, 6.3.5., Property (10) and Section 6.4]).
Finally we would like to stress that our WLU is introduced on the purely heuristic grounds outlined above. A deeper theo-
retical underpinning is beyond the scope of this article, howeverwould be highly desirable.Wewill ﬁnd that for our somewhat
paradigmatic imprecise prior, WLU delivers much more intuitive results than ML, and is much more informative than GBR.
We will refer to these three generalizations of Bayes’ formula also as ‘‘learning rules” in the following.
2.2. Interpretation of overly inclusive prior classes
We would like to address a further conceptual difﬁculty that occurs when dealing with classes of priors P0 assigned by
some easy-to-handle mathematical model. For instance our (stylized) class of priors with prescribed marginals (see (8)) may
be too inclusive for a particular application, i.e., it may contain priors that do not correspond to any reasonable expert opin-
ion, and so P0!P, where P describes the correct set of priors. The opinions in P0 nP may drastically distort the inferred
upper (lower) probabilities. There are two ways how to deal with such a ‘‘contaminated class” P0:rnatively one could think of non-linear forms of weighting or simply applying GBR to the class of priors that are characterized by a certain minimum of
However, such generalizations shall be investigated elsewhere.
above weighting rule represents an ‘‘improper scoring rule” [9], p. 137, as it poses an incentive to competing experts to produce over-conﬁdent
nts [3], [9], p.137. However here we do not have to deal with the ‘‘properness” of scoring as our imprecise prior is supposed to be a model for a single,
sistent expert who is supposed to be properly elicited.
s demonstrates that WLU does not involve ‘‘double counting” (see also footnote 6 on that issue) of data in the standard sense, where data may be used
ithin sequential Bayesian updating. Here data are used twice, but in ‘‘orthogonal” ways. The issue of ‘‘using the evidence twice” is of concern for Gilboa’s
meidler’s rule as well.
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2.3 we will suggest a catalogue of such additional ﬁlters that should be observed in standard applications. For exam-
ple, we will argue that only those priors should be considered further that come with a density whose gradient does
not transgress a certain norm.
(2) If the wrong elements of the prior class cannot be ﬁltered out, one has to be aware that the three rules discussed show
quite different behavior. For GBR the following convenient relationship holds, which is a direct consequence of the
deﬁnition of GBR:
When using GBR, the upper (lower) probability derived from the overly inclusive class of priorsP0 serves as an upper (lower)
boundary of the upper (lower) probability derived from the correct class P.
This property conveniently implies that – in the case of the GBR – we are always on the safe side (i.e., we do not add
spurious information) when we include also those priors we are not sure about yet.
On the contrary, for the weighted as well as for maximum likelihood update method, the probability interval derived
from an overly inclusive classP0 must not be interpreted as a outer boundary of the correct probability interval result-
ing from P. Therefore the weighted or maximum likelihood update method can be used only after we have ﬁnally
decided for any prior whether it should enter the class or not.
To illustrate this point, imagine an assembly of ‘‘experts” E1, . . . ,Ei, . . . ,EM, most of whommay in fact be charlatans, who
for any i 2 {1, . . . ,M}, assign 100% chance to lottery result yi and zero to any yjwith j 6¼ i, then accidentally the correspond-
ing opinion Piwould be highlighted if yiwasmeasured. So a lot of trust would be given to a potential charlatan’s opinion
Pi although it was just chosen for trivial reasons and not because it was characterized by higher a priori competence.Therefore, ﬁltering out false priors would have two effects: GBR would become more informative and we would avoid
distortions in using the weighted or maximum likelihood update rule.
Note that in the present article, we purposefully suppress another layer of complication: in applications, it will generically
prove very difﬁcult to completely ‘‘purify” the set of priors from ‘‘contaminations” as mentioned above and – vice versa – to
make sure that none of the ‘‘correct” precise measures was included in the set of priors. Along the lines of robust statistics
one would therefore analyze the ‘‘robustness” of the (in our case imprecise) posterior along minuscule changes of the (in our
case ‘‘puriﬁed” imprecise) prior. In this article we would like to highlight the effects of changing the update rules as distinct
from those stemming from varying the prior. Future work will have to show how posterior robustness against minuscule
changes of the imprecise prior should be operationalized and whether there is a ranking among the three update rules intro-
duced above with respect to that kind of robustness.
2.3. Further constraints on the class of priors
Since we refocus on modeling the prior knowledge of one single expert, we ask what such an expert generically would be
able to hold an informed opinion on, in order to narrow down the class to reasonable priors:
(1) The density of the priors should be unimodal [34, Section 3.2.4] for an overview of references.
(2) We assume that the typical 1D (i.e., marginal) resolution over which an expert can hold an informed opinion, reads dx1
(here ‘‘1” for ‘‘1D”) if the typical dimension of the problem is Dx. This implies that an expert can distinguish N1  Dx/
dx1 items. Our requirement is equivalent to Walley’s ‘‘bounded derivative model” [46] and shall be called gradient ﬁlter
in the following.
(3) This prescription needs to be generalized to a n-dimensional parameter space:
(a) A possible generalization that would lead to a particularly large prior class is obtained by allowing for a reso-
lution in terms of cubes of length dx1, i.e., Nn  Nn1.
(b) The other extreme may require that Nn  N1.We can connect both extreme cases byNn :¼ Nbnþð1bÞ1 ; ð6Þ
hence we construct the linear hull of the exponents of both cases, b 2 [0,1]. Such a connection may turn out to
be necessary as both extreme cases display dissatisfying features:(a) Let b = 0) Nn = N1. As Nn ¼ Dxn=dxnn (with dxn denoting the length of the edge of the n-dimensional cube), we
observe: limn!1dxn ¼ limn!1Dx=N1=nn ¼ Dx. This demonstrates that the expert may not have much knowledge
left on the nD parameter space, measured in terms of 1D information dxn.
(b) On the other hand, b ¼ 1) Nn ¼ Nn1 would require a prior competence of the expert, exponentially growing
with dimension, that seems unrealistic as well.Both phenomena are rooted in the ‘‘curse of dimension”. Hence,
there is urgent need for an expert elicitation that is designed to obtain a meaningful intermediate value for b.
For the time being we derive the consequences of various values for b. Once b has been decided on, the current
(third) prescription on prior distributions requires that the modulus of the distribution’s gradient to be smaller
than ð1=dxnnÞ=dx ¼ Dxðnþ1Þ  Nbnþ1þð1bÞ=n1 .2.4. Speciﬁcation of the output quantity of interest
In order to keep the discussion as transparent as possible, in the following we will focus on a single ouput quantity of
interest whose posterior probability shall be derived. For that we choose the probability of ruin
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Z 1
x1
dx1
Z 1
1
dx2Ppost;yðx1; x2Þ; ð7Þi.e., the probability that x1 (e.g., climate sensitivity) is larger than a certain threshold value x1.
3. Priors with given marginals
In this Section, we will specify our prior model used in the investigation later on. The model considers given marginals,
but leaves the correlation structure completely open. This model has also attracted some attention outside the area of Bayes-
ian updating (cf. [6,17,22,32,33,42]), the resulting lower and upper joint probabilities are then typically called Fréchet
bounds in this setting [23].
3.1. A questionnaire on the structure of prior knowledge
3.1.1. Design of the questionnaire and choice of experts
Wehave claimedabove that climate changemodelers typicallynot only knowmore about individual parameters thanabout
their correlations but are often even completely unable to elicitate correlation. In order to underpin this claimwe developed a
questionnaire on the structure of prior knowledge about model parameters. We considered users of the following models:
	 The climate model of intermediate complexity CLIMBER-2 (corresponding to a system of more than 1000 ordinary differ-
ential equations) [24,37].
	 The complex ocean model MOM-3 [36].
	 The dynamic vegetation model LPJ [13].
	 The model of endogenous economic growth MIND [20].
We asked them – among other items – whether for a given uncertain model parameter b, the expert would be willing to
give probabilistic information in terms of a density function. Any of experts that participated in the survey would do so. Then
we checked for the betting behavior on quantiles of b. We found certain discrepancies with the density function speciﬁed
before that may suggest the use of imprecise measures on b. However, these aspects are not discussed here and will be pub-
lished elsewhere, together with the questionnaire. In the context of this article, we would like to focus on the central ques-
tion concerning the choice of our model (8):
How do you judge the quality of your subjective knowledge on b compared to the quality of your knowledge on correlations of b
with other unknown parameters?
3.1.2. Answers collected in the expert elicitation
Typical expert responses from the survey are quoted below:
	 ‘‘For some of the parameters, I know about the sign of correlations, however my knowledge is less precise than that on
individual parameters.”
	 ‘‘Knowledge on b is higher than knowledge on correlations with other parameters (on some speciﬁc parameters, it might
be different).”
	 ‘‘The parameter knowledge is relatively good but the knowledge on correlation with other parameters in some cases is
only an idea.”
	 ‘‘I have not considered the possibility of correlations.”
	 ‘‘Never thought about that point.”
	 ‘‘It would be impossible to specify anything on correlations.”
	 ‘‘Absolutely no comment on correlations.”
We would like to stress again that those statements were made by experts who at the same time were willing to specify
prior knowledge in probabilistic terms on individual parameters! Our rather informal kind of elicitation, to a certain extent,
establishes much less precise knowledge on correlations than on marginals. In case the actual numbers for speciﬁc models
were to be elicited in the future, including rudimentary knowledge on correlations, we shall observe existing methodologies
on multivariate elicitation [25, Section 2.3]. However, [25] stress the difﬁculty to elicit multivariate rather than univariate
entities, an instance adding further imprecision to the representation of correlations.
3.2. Consequences for our choice of an imprecise model
Therefore we feel the urgent need to consider the somewhat extreme case of imprecise prior knowledge with prescribed
marginals (i.e., knowledge on individual parameters) and fully unconstrained correlation structure. This class – already dis-
cussed in different settings, in particular, in [6,17,22,32,33,42] – is deﬁned for the case of two marginals P1, P2 by
10 The
also app
r-ﬁnite
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11 For
12 Not
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Z
dx2Pðx1; x2Þ ¼ P1ðx1Þ; 8x2
Z
dx1Pðx1; x2Þ ¼ P2ðx2Þ
 
; ð8Þwhere P1, P2 are speciﬁed by the expert. Hereby for simplicity within this article we assume again continuous random vari-
ables.10 Note that any element P of this class is by construction normalized to 1.
There are some analytical and procedural results on classes of priors with prescribed precise marginals before
[22,23,35,42] and after updating [32,34]. Here we abstain from using those results since they do not apply to non-convex
classes as considered here. The updating procedure of it, in particular according to our new WLU, requires some extra treat-
ment which is easiest performed with an explicit parameterization of our prior.
4. Updating our imprecise prior
4.1. Specifying the marginals and the likelihood function
In this Section, we apply all three generalized learning rules to the class of priors constrained by Gaussian marginals. (As
any non-degenerate marginal speciﬁed by an expert can be mapped onto a Gaussian through a suitable coordinate transfor-
mation, no loss of generality is introduced in this instance.) For comparison, we also present the result of a conventional
Bayesian analysis where a precise Gaussian prior is derived from the marginals by assuming independence between the
parameters and updated using Bayes’ rule. We then repeat the analysis for strict subsets of the original class of priors. These
subsets consist of those priors which have passed two versions of the gradient ﬁlter introduced in Section 2.3. Such prior
classes seem to model an expert’s knowledge more realistically. Finally, we summarize our results in considering the exam-
ple of how the stylized insurance company may base its contracting decisions upon it.
We specify the marginal P1  N(l,r2) as a Gaussian with mean l and variance11 r2, and take l = 1/2, r = 1/4, P2  P1, hence
we select marginals that contain ±2 standard deviations in [0,1].
The most general class of priors with prescribed marginals has been deﬁned in Eq. (8) in Section 3.2. However, for this
article we sacriﬁce generality for an analytically elegant and transparent implementation of the otherwise intricate and
potentially only numerically accessible unimodality ﬁlter. We consider the simplest non-trivial choice of the class of priors,
and require that any prior should be a bivariate Gaussian. That choice ensures that any prior is unimodal.12 Later on we will
also require bounds on the gradients, thereby avoiding degenerate, essentially lower-than two-dimensional Gaussians (see
Fig. 1, left and right graphs). Before that, however, we would like to study Bayesian updating on the class of bivariate Gaussians
with unrestricted gradients.
For simplicity we assume further that the likelihood function L is Gaussian as well and x1,x2 determine its mean through a
linear transformation ðx1; x2Þ ! jx1 þ x2; j 2 R under the ‘‘observation” y. So we havey ¼ jx1 þ x2 þ g; g  Nð0; r2g Þ ð9Þ
andLyðx1; x2Þ  Pðy j x1; x2Þ :¼ Nðjx1 þ x2; r2g ÞðyÞ: ð10Þ
This likelihood could be interpreted as a climate model that from the property x1 would predict jx1 (with well-known j)
which in turn could in principle be compared to the noisy observation y. However modelers may know that the model could
have a systematic bias x2, hampering direct comparison with y. Such statements have actually been made on the model
CLIMBER-2 (highlighted in the expert elicitation) with {prior variance(x2)
 variance(rg)} for global mean temperature.
If jjj  1 or if jjj 
 1 the transfer function would essentially be one-dimensional and any of the updating rules would
result in similar posterior probabilities of ruin. Hence we choose the non-trivial case jjj  1. The quantity rg represents an-
other degree of freedom. As this article deals with the representation of imprecise prior knowledge and its updating and not
so much with the uncertainty contained in the likelihood, the variance of the prior marginals should be much higher than the
variance of y, and so we choose rg r, in particular, rg = r/10 when we have to specify it. This is also in accordance with the
experts’ statements on CLIMBER-2 as mentioned in the paragraph above. Furthermore, as will become apparent below, for
small rg, jjj = 1 reveals a degenerate exception (compare Eq. (16)) for which reason we avoid such a choice. Whenever we do
not display the dependency of results on j but have to ﬁx its value (e.g., for numerical results) we choose j: = 1.05.
As recalled in the Appendix A.1 a two-dimensional Gaussian prior P satisﬁes the constraints set by the marginals
N(l,r2), iff there exists f 2 [1,1] withR ¼ r2 1 f
f 1
 
; ð11Þmore general case is easily obtained by replacing the Lebesgue measure with an appropriate dominating measure. In particular, the basic development
lies to the discrete case, where the corresponding integrals become simple sums. Note further in this context that if Pi(), i = 1,2, is dominated by some
measure ki(), i = 1,2, then every element of P is dominated by k1()  k2(). In particular, since P1() and P2() are assumed to be absolutely continuous
out the paper, also every P 2 P shares this property and can be described by an appropriate Lebesgue density.
a multivariate application, the ﬁrst entry would represent a vector of means, the second the symmetric covariance matrix.
e that the class is not convex.
Fig. 1. Three extreme representatives of the class of Gaussian priors with prescribed marginals. From left to right: maximally anticorrelated case (f = 1),
uncorrelated case (f = 0), and maximally correlated case (f = 1)– for a deﬁnition of the parameter f see Eq. (11). The maximally (anti)correlated cases are
degenerate in the sense that the supports of the distributions are one-dimensional. This will lead to paradoxical inferences during Bayesian updating.
220 H. Held et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 49 (2008) 212–233and P  N((l,l)t,R), whereby R denotes the covariance matrix of P and the results for f = ±1 are to be understood as the
respective limit being taken.
Hence, we conveniently parameterize the class P of bivariate Gaussian priors with prescribed marginals by one single
parameter f 2 [1,1], which is simply the correlation coefﬁcient of x1 and x2. Setting f = 0 represents the uncorrelated (stan-
dard), f = ±1 the maximally (anti)correlated case (see again Fig. 1).13 In the following, we will call this P correlation class.
4.2. Posterior properties
With the speciﬁcation of the likelihood (see Eq. (10)) and the parameterization of the correlation class, we can calculate
the set of posterior distributions as a function of the correlation coefﬁcient f and the observation y. To obtain the posterior
marginal Ppost(x1) for our quantity of interest x1, we have to integrate the bivariate posterior over x2, revealing (see Appendix
A.2)13 Fré
f 2 [1,
When o
14 As
probabiPpostðx1 j yÞ  Nðl0ðf ; yÞ; r02ðf ; yÞÞ with
l0ðf ; yÞ ¼ lð1 ð1 f Þðj 1Þr
2=r2gÞ þ ðf þ jÞyr2=r2g
1þ ð1þ 2fjþ j2Þr2=r2g
;
r0ðf ; yÞ ¼ r
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ð1 f 2Þr2=r2g
1þ ð1þ 2fjþ j2Þr2=r2g
s
: ð12ÞWe utilize this expression to calculate the posterior probability of ruin with respect to x1Ppost; yðf Þ ¼
Z 1
x1
Nðl0ðf ; yÞ; ðr0ðf ; yÞÞ2Þðx1Þdx1: ð13ÞThe dependency of the probability of ruin on y is depicted in Fig. 2, upper graph, dotted curved line, for the assumption of
independent parameters (uncorrelated case f = 0, i.e., P(x1,x2) = P1(x1)  P2(x2)) and particular choices of j = 1.05, threshold va-
lue x1 ¼ 0:95, (beyond which ruin occurs) and variance of the observation rg = r/10.14
The case of dominating likelihood uncertainty – not to be considered further – is obtained by rg?1:
lim
rg!1
l0 ¼ l;
lim
rg!1
r0 ¼ r; ð14Þi.e., if the measurement y becomes non-informative on jx1 + x2, then the marginal prior and posterior on xi are identical. We
now apply the different learning rules in our setting.
4.3. Application of generalized Bayes’ rule (GBR)
In order to derive the upper and lower probability of ruin according to GBR, we simply have to ask for the supremum and
the inﬁmum of Ppost;yðf Þ over the correlation coefﬁcient f 2 [1,1] for given y. (While in [32] an algorithm is introduced for
GBR on prior classes with prescribedmarginals, we have to point out that the algorithm cannot be utilized here as our class is
not convex.) We display the result as function of y in Fig. 2, upper graph, dashed-dotted lines. Both curves derived from GBR
display quasi step-function type behavior.chet [23] derived bounds for classes of priors with prescribed precise marginals. For our class it follows: Let F the cumulative marginal distribution,
1], and Hf the cumulative distribution of the prior characterized by f. Then for any x1,x2,max(F(x1) + F(x2)  1,0) 6 Hf(x1,x2) 6min(F(x1),F(x2)) [23].
bserving that for all x1, f = ±1, Hf(x1 + 1/2, ± x1 + 1/2) = F(x1), we readily see that f = 1, + 1 represent the lower and upper Fréchet bounds, respectively.
mentioned above, we will stick to these parameter values whenever values need to be speciﬁed in the remainder of this article. As to be expected, the
lity of ruin increases monotonously with y.
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Fig. 2. Probability of ruin for the correlation class parameterized by the coefﬁcient f (see Eq. (11)) for j ¼ 1:05; x1 ¼ 0:95, rg = r/10. Top: horizontal dotted
line: prior value, curved dotted: posterior value for the (standard) case of independent parameters (f = 0), dashed-dotted: posterior bounds from the GBR
that displays a quasi step-function-like behavior. Center: solid line: maximum likelihood estimate, dashed lines: weighted maximum likelihood estimate.
The maximum likelihood estimate leads to rather low probabilities of ruin. The fact that the solid curve shows a non-monotonic relation between
measurement and vastly deviates from its weighted counterpart (dashed) undermines trust in that updating method. Bottom: Correlation parameter f
obtained from maximum likelihood update method, given y. For large y, the maximum likelihood update method prefers f = 1. Then Bayesian learning
implies the intersection of the support of the likelihood with the line x1 = x2 (fully correlated), hence, the posterior concentrates all weight in a small line
segment around a central point. Therefore, the probability of ruin must show a sharp transition (center graph, solid line) when this point crosses x1 as a
function of y.
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y 2 [1.3,1.8] GBR reveals no information at all on the posterior probability of ruin, i.e., we only know Ppost;y 2 ½0;1. Hence,
in the GBR paradigm, utilizing the more realistic class of priors instead of the uncorrelated prior only, reveals drastically dif-
ferent results. The question is: how would the results change when less conservative (compared to the GBR) methods of
updating are being used? Before we discuss these methods we would like to highlight the underlying reason for the non-
informative features of GBR.
4.4. The illustrative limit rg? 0
In Fig. 2, we have displayed results for the choice rg = r/10, hence the variance of the likelihood function P(yjx1,x2) is much
smaller than the variance of the prior. We can expect to ﬁnd the analytically transparent case rg? 0 an illustrative limit for
understanding the behavior of the posterior under GBR. If rg? 0, then the support of L(x1,x2) = P(yjx1,x2) collapses to the
one-dimensional linear manifold that solves the equation y = j x1 + x2. Furthermore,lim
rg!0
l0ðf ; yÞ ¼ lð1 f Þð1 jÞ þ yðf þ jÞ
1þ 2fjþ j2 ;
lim
rg!0
r0ðf ; yÞ ¼ r
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 f 2
1þ 2fjþ j2
s
: ð15ÞNow consider the degenerate priors for f = ±1.
Eq. (15) imply limjfj?1r
0
= 0. In that limit, the prior P and the likelihood Ly represent two 1D lines in the 2D space spanned
by x1,x2, intersecting only at one point, leaving no space for posterior uncertainty in x1. Hence, the support of Papost(x1) col-
lapses to l
0
. Therefore it is worthwhile to explicitly report l
0
for these two extreme cases:l0ðf ¼ 1; yÞ ¼ y 2l
j 1 ; ð16Þ
l0ðf ¼ þ1; yÞ ¼ y
jþ 1 ; ð17Þ
222 H. Held et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 49 (2008) 212–233which can also be interpreted as the intersection of the lines y = jx1 + x2 either with 1 = x1 + x2 (see Fig. 3, for f = 1), or with
x1 = x2 (for f = 1), i.e., the intersection of d-type likelihood and (anti)correlated prior, respectively. From Eqs. (16) and (17) we
conclude further (compare also Fig. 4):Fig. 3.
the inte
the pos
extrem
Fig. 4.
These t
the prioPpostðf ¼ 1Þ ¼
0 for y < ðj 1Þ x1 þ 2l
1 for yP ðj 1Þ x1 þ 2l
 
; ð18Þ
Ppostðf ¼ þ1Þ ¼
0 for y < ðjþ 1Þ x1
1 for yP ðjþ 1Þ x1
 
: ð19ÞThese two equations explain the structural changes in Ppost:GBR;y (at y  1) and Ppost.GBR,y (at y  2), depicted as dashed-dotted
lines in Fig. 2, upper graph (the positions of the discontinuities can easily be understood by noting j; x1  1). Hence GBR is
non-informative over a large interval of observations y (in our example for y 2 [1,  2]), i.e., we lose all information on theDiscussion of Bayesian learning for the double degenerate case rg? 0, f? 1 (fully anticorrelated prior). Bayesian learning is reduced to looking up
rsection of the lines ‘‘1 = x1 + x2” and ‘‘y = j x1 + x2”. Note that although the posterior uncertainty on x1 is zero (‘‘a well-deﬁned intersection of lines”),
terior value for x1 strongly varies with mild variations in y. For f = +1, quite the contrary is the case. Hence, in many parameter settings, these two
e cases tend to span a large interval for the probability of ruin for GBR, leading to non-informative results.
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Illustration of Eqs. (18) and (19): Bayesian learning for the two degenerate priors P(f = ±1) and rg? 0 (given the standard values j ¼ 1:05; x1 ¼ 0:95).
wo priors alone are sufﬁcient to open the rather large non-informative window between y  1 and y  2 when GBR is used for updating. As before,
r probability of ruin is indicated by the dotted line.
H. Held et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 49 (2008) 212–233 223probability of ruin due to Bayesian updating of the correlation class. This is an extreme example of dilated posterior prob-
ability bounds (compared to the prior probability) over a signiﬁcant range of observations (see Seidenfeld and Wasserman
[40] for a discussion of the dilation phenomenon where posterior bounds are dilated for all possible measurements y). It
should be noted that dilated posterior bounds also occur in the more realistic case of non-vanishing variance of likelihood
function (see Fig. 2). In fact, the only likelihood function for which there exists no observation y that dilates the posterior
probability of ruin is the non-informative likelihood function with rg?1. We ﬁnd this behavior of the GBR dissatisfying
in this setting, and will investigate whether it could be avoided by more informative learning rules.
The priors with f? 1 display a further type of ‘‘instability” that is not exhibited by f? +1: Let j = :1 + e. Then
l
0
(f = 1,y) = (y  2l)/e, according to Eq. (16). This implies for j  1, e 1 that Bayesian learning in the strongly anticorrelat-
ed limit is very unstable with respect to the measurement y even if only this single prior is considered.
For all these reasons, we will restrict the updating problem by (i) restricting the gradient of prior densities which would
exclude jfj? 1 (see Section 4.6), and (ii) implementing the more informative maximum likelihood upate rule and the new
weighted likelihood upate rule for the unrestricted class of bivariate Gaussians with prescribed marginals.
4.5. Likelihood update results
4.5.1. Maximum likelihood updating
In order to calculate the results from the maximum update likelihood rule, we need to assess the prior density of observ-
ing y for a given prior Pf(x1,x2) = N((l,l),R(f))(x1,x2) across the class of Gaussian priors parameterized by correlation
f 2 [1,1]. It is shown in the Appendix that the resulting density is again Gaussian with Pf ðyÞ ¼ Nðly; r2yðf ÞÞ; ly ¼ lð1þ jÞ,
and r2yðf Þ ¼ r2ð1þ 2jf þ j2Þ þ r2g . Note that the mean of Pf(y) is independent of f while its variance is not, and it assumes
values between ðj 1Þ2r2 þ r2g .
The maximum likelihood rule requires us to select only those priors which yield the highest weight Wy(f) = Pf(y) on
observing the particular y that actually occurs. By standard curve discussion we can show that Pf(y) is maximized w.r.t. f
by solving the equation ry(f) = jy  lyj in case there exists a solution over f 2 [1,1] or by maximization over f 2 {1,1} other-
wise. Most importantly, the maximum is unique. Hence there exists a one-to-one mapping from observation y to correlation
parameter f characterizing the prior Pf(x1,x2) that maximizes the prior probability of y. Accordingly the maximum likelihood
update rule selects only one prior which then is to be updated by means of Bayes’ rule.15 Consequently, the class of posteriors
consists of exactly one element, for which reason we can drop the upper and lower bar for the corresponding probability of ruin
PML;y, which is uniquely determined by the correlation parameter f.
The dependence of f on y is shown in Fig. 2, lower graph. Extreme values of y are most easily generated by f = 1 while
central values of y are more preferred by f = 1. Between these two cases there is a continuous transition.
Fig. 2, center graph, shows the probability of ruin that results from the maximum likelihood update method. It yields a
non-monotonous functional relation PMLðyÞ that may appear counter-intuitive at a ﬁrst glance. However the non-monoto-
nous behavior can be understood when one relates the center to the lower graph. When discussing only y-branches with
fML(y) = 1, P

ML;y is monotone as it must be. However, in between, around y  j, the updating rule prefers the anticorrelated
prior which must lead to a sharp switch in PML;y as y  j is crossed (see Eq. (16) and remark afterwards). Hence the interplay
of changing y as well as fML(y) leads to a non-monotonous P

ML;y.
4.5.2. Weighted likelihood updating
We now compare the results from the maximum likelihood update rule to the results from its weighted counterpart (see
also Appendix A.5). In order to calculate the set of posteriors under the weighted likelihood update rule, we need to identify
the level sets PðwyÞ of priors which yield weight W(f): = Pf(y) =wy for a given observation y. Conveniently it turns out that
each level set consists at most of two priors (in case there are two, their f-values would bracket fML).
As a key result, in Fig. 2, center graph, it becomes apparent that maximum (solid line) and weighted (dashed lines) like-
lihood update qualitatively deviate for y > 1.5. Fig. 5 illuminates the underlying reason. Large values of y force the maximum
likelihood rule to select f = 1 which comes with P* = 0 for y < 1.9 (see Eq. (19)). However, the center graph of Fig. 5 reveals that
if one allowed for fmildly smaller than 1, P* = 0 is structurally unstable, hence, a weighting method must result in much larger
values for P*, as shown in the lower graph. The lower graph furthermore illustrates the ‘‘purifying” mechanism within any of
the likelihood methods: those priors resulting in P* = 1 due to dilation-type behavior come with zero weight, hence their
inﬂuence on P* is eliminated by both likelihood methods (but not by standard GBR).
The fact that the maximum likelihood update drastically deviates from its weighted counterpart casts doubt on the reli-
ability of the maximum likelihood update rule and gives the impression that it may be fundamentally ‘‘non-robust”. One may
argue that the non-monotone behavior may disappear once the class of priors is chosen more adequately – by avoiding ex-
tremely degenerate cases like f = ±1 that come along with diverging gradients. In the following Subsections we will see, how-
ever, that this is not the case; quite the contrary, any effect observed so far can be found again (although in a somewhat
smoothed version) when gradients become restricted.15 So, in this context the type II maximum likelihood procedure and the maximum likelihood updating coincide.
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Fig. 5. Relation of weight function W(.), parameter f specifying the prior, and probability of ruin, for the special case y ¼ 1:7; j ¼ 1:05; x1 ¼ 0:95;rg ¼ r=10.
The maximum likelihood update rule requires us to select the f = fML, i.e., the prior for whichW, the prior probability of y is largest. Hence, fML = 1 (see upper
graph). This was to be expected as for the rather ‘‘large” value of y, the prior with highest correlation (i.e., f = 1) prefers the ‘‘extreme” y the most among all
priors. However, P*(y = 1.7,f = 1) = 0 (see Eq. (19) and center graph). The important point is that the case f = 1 is exceptional within the class of priors as for
f 2 [1,0.5], P* > 0.1 (center graph). The bottom graph shows that when averaging P*(f(W)) over the W-scale weighted with W, an average somewhere
between 0.1 and 0.3 is to be expected (weighted likelihood update method), drastically differing from the maximum likelihood update.
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Imposing constraints on the gradients basically results in a reduction of the class of Gaussians with prescribed marginals
that is reﬂected in a reduction of the range for the correlation parameter f at its outer ends. The way how to infer from the
expert’s ‘‘resolution” parameter N on the admissible range of f is described in Appendix A.6.2.
Figs. 6 and 7 display the most extreme members of P if we set in (6) N1 :¼ 5 and b :¼ 0 or =1, respectively (i.e., N2 :¼ N1 or
N2 :¼ N21, respectively). In the latter case, we allow for ‘‘more” prior, mutually distinct opinions.
Figs. 8 (for b = 0) and 9 (for b = 1) reveal the effects of imposing gradient constraints on the class of priors. The curves for
the probability of ruin P*(y) become smoother, in particular in the case b = 0, and more similar. However, still drastic differ-
ences between various updating methods remain:
	 Standard Bayesian learning (i.e., the uncorrelated case, upper graph, curved dotted line) results in a more optimistic esti-
mate than given by the upper probability of ruin from GBR.
	 For 1.4 < y < 1.8, the upper probability of ruin according to the weighted likelihood method (lower graphs, dashed curves)
exceeds the estimate according to the maximum likelihood update method (lower graph, solid line), in part by an order of
magnitude. It demonstrates that maximum likelihood update for the class of Gaussian priors is not a structurally robust
learning rule (in line with the discussion in Fig. 5). This ﬁnding casts doubt on results obtained by that method and we do
not recommend adopting the maximum likelihood update rule.Fig. 6. Extreme members of the class of priors for a bounded gradient condition, consistent with 5 blocks in the 2D parameter space (N2 = N1 = 5) b = 0
along the notation of Eq. (6). Left graph for minimum f, center for the (standard) uncorrelated case (f = 0), right graph for maximum f.
Fig. 7. The same as in Fig. 6, yet for dimension-adjusted resolution (i.e., b = 1): N2 :¼ N21 ¼ 52. Note that in higher dimensions n (here: n = 2) the prescri-
ptions for Nn according to the present versus the previous graph would diverge the more, the larger n. We propose that a realistic description prescriptions
for Nn would imply a compromise between these extremes of spatial resolution that reﬂect the degree of sophistication expert options may display.
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Fig. 8. The same as Fig. 2, however, for bounded gradients according to N2: = 5, b = 0 in (6). Bounding of the gradients reveals much softer curves. Note,
however, that even for this class of priors ‘‘regularized” by the gradient ﬁlter, maximum likelihood update strongly deviates from weighted likelihood
update. This demonstrates how questionable it may be to use maximum likelihood update–that is based on a single prior in our case–if one desires a more
balanced (through weighting) inﬂuence of all the priors.
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For the following interpretation one may imagine a stylized, rather conservative insurance company that offers contracts
only clients with an upper probability of ruin below a given threshold. The latter depends on the number of clients to pool
the risk with and the upper probability of the company’s ruin, the company is willing to accept. For illustrative purposes, in
the following we assume two cases of upper limits per client the company is willing to accept: P ¼ 13% or 27%.16 The point
is now that the company has no direct access to a client’s P but needs to indirectly infer on P by observing the ‘‘client char-
acteristic y,” that could be ‘‘measured” in principle.
Fig. 10 highlights the link between the upper probability of ruin and the maximum admissible client characteristic y*, for
any of the learning rules discussed in this paper. We have indicated P ¼ 27% by a horizontal solid line. From the four inter-
secting curves PðyÞ we can then deduce the maximum y, i.e., y*, for which the insurance company would agree to insure a
client (for the intermediate gradient ﬁlter b = 1). The y* values for P ¼ 13% or 27% and the four learning rules are summa-
rized in Fig. 11 and Table 1.
Obviously, y* is a strong function of the learning rule. The ordering is in part also a function of the admissible P*. GBR re-
sults in the most exclusive, maximum likelihood in the most inclusive insurance policy. Clients with 1.37 < y < 1.90 would be
rejected due to GBR, but insured according to the maximum likelihood rule. Of the four learning rules, GBR is the one that16 An illustration of those numbers can be found in [28, Section 5].
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Fig. 10. Decision implications of the results from Fig. 9 to be assessed by a stylized insurance company requesting an upper probability of ruin of 27%
(horizontal solid line). The line styles are again as follows. Dashed-dotted: GBR; dashed: (new) weighted likelihood; dotted: standard precise method (based
on assuming independent marginals); solid: maximum likelihood update rule. For any of the four learning rules, we indicate the maximum characteristic y*
with which a client would be insured by a vertical line. Obviously, y* is a strong function of the learning rule. GBR would lead to the most exclusive
insurance practice. When the company accepted the weighted likelihood update method (dashed line), clients with 1.37 < y < 1.78 would be insured in
addition.
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Fig. 9. The same as the previous ﬁgure, yet for a larger number of independent expert opinions, i.e., N2: = 52, b = 1. The curves describe an intermediate
case between Figs. 2 and 8.
226 H. Held et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 49 (2008) 212–233certainly does not add spurious information. If the insurance company found GBR not informative enough, however, as there
might be too few clients with y 6 yGBR, out of the remaining three learning rules we would recommend adoption of our new
weighted likelihood update rule as the most robust variant. Its superiority compared to the maximum likelihood update rule
has already been discussed above. Compared to the standard Bayesian updating, assuming independent marginals, large dif-
ferences in the assessment of the probability of ruin exist particularly for y < 1.2, i.e., the regime of small probabilities. There
the standard method estimates the probability of ruin to be up to an order of magnitude lower than indicated by the
weighted likelihood update rule.
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Fig. 11. y*, the upper limit of characteristics ywith which clients would be insured in dependence on different learning rules und number of clients: Circles:
P ¼ 13%; crosses: P ¼ 27%. The abscissa indicates the four learning rules considered in this paper. Weighted L: (new) weighted likelihood update rule;
Precise Prior: standard Bayesian updating starting with a precise uncorrelated prior; ML: maximum likelihood update rule. It is remarkable that–for
P ¼ 27%– more than 50% of the gap between the robust, yet least informative GBR and the most optimistic, yet non-robust maximum likelihood update
rule can be regained when using the new weighted likelihood update rule. (As for previous Figures all entries are for j ¼ 1:05; x1 ¼ 0:95;rg ¼ r=10).
Table 1
y*, the upper limit of ‘‘measurements” ywith which clients would be insured in dependence on different learning rules and admissible probabilities of ruin (per
client)
P 13% 27%
Updating rule y* y*
1 Generalized Bayes rule (GBR) 1.23 1.37
2 Weighted likelihood 1.43 1.78
3 Uncorrelated prior 1.54 1.72
4 Maximum likelihood 1.86 1.90
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ents that were rejected by GBR.
5. Summary and discussion
Using a stylized Gaussian analysis, this article addresses the chain of prevailing conceptual challenges one faces when
attempting to update multivariate prior knowledge on adjustable deterministic models: the chain made-up by the formal
representation of imprecise prior knowledge over ex-ante re-adjustment of overly conservative priors to some sort of gen-
eralized Bayesian updating of that prior.
We have set up a model for subjective uncertainty that aims at reﬂecting the opinions held by many Earth system mod-
elers concerned with climate, biosphere and economic systems. By means of a questionnaire we found that the experts ex-
press much more conﬁdence in marginals of priors (on model parameters) rather than in the correlation structure of those
priors. Based on this insight, we have studied an imprecise prior deﬁned by prescribing the marginals only. We have pre-
sented a show-case for Bayesian updating on the basis of that imprecise prior, based on the simplest multi-dimensional
transfer function possible: y = jx1 + x2 in combination with Gaussian probability density functions. To accomplish Bayesian
learning we utilized two generalizations of Bayes’ rule to imprecise priors that have appeared in the literature and also intro-
duced a new method.
In particular we have considered the following updating rules which – even in our rather elementary example – unfolded
rich posterior properties:
(1) Updating along the lines of generalized Bayes’ rule (GBR), under which each member of the prior class is updated, and
then the extremes among the posteriors are selected to calculate the lower and upper bound on the quantity of
interest.
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ing the actual measurement y. It leads to more informative results than GBR. However, we ﬁnd the rule hard to justify
as it completely disregards even those priors which may perform in the prediction only inﬁnitesimally less well than
the optimal priors. Also this leads to counter-intuitively large posterior sensitivity as well as large non-monotonicity
with respect to the observational evidence.
(3) For that reason we have introduced a weighted likelihood update method that considers all priors, yet weights their
inﬂuence on the posterior result. When applied to the class of priors that appears as most realistic in practice (i.e., the
class of gradient-limited Gaussians) we ﬁnd that the two likelihood methods may deviate by an order of magnitude in
their estimate of the posterior probability of ruin.
The weighted likelihood method carries the drawback (or advantage) that the weighting function implies a degree of
freedom that is subject to normative decisions. We have chosen a weighting proportional to the prior probability of
the measurement. Both likelihood methods are more informative than GBR; however, they share the disadvantage
that they may add spurious information if the class of priors is overly inclusive (i.e., contains incompetent expert opin-
ions), in contrast to GBR.
(4) For comparison we also considered the naive Bayesian solution based on the single prior derived from simply assum-
ing independence. This typically leads to much lower probabilities of ruin, when compared to GBR or the weighted
likelihood method.
Here we propose to consider GBR as the most conservative and easiest to justify rule ﬁrst: if the class of priors is contam-
inated with unjustiﬁed elements, GBR nevertheless does not produce spurious information due to those elements. If all ele-
ments canbe justiﬁed, themore informativeweighted likelihoodupdatemethodmaybeused, although it is harder to interpret.
In case one distrusts some of the elements contained in the set of priors used for calculation (so that both likelihood
methods may produce spurious information) and GBR turns out non-informative, one may try to eliminate those priors. A
subtle as well as practically relevant point here is that in fact we have reasons to believe that degenerate priors (in our exam-
ple strongly (anti-)correlated priors) most likely are not members of the class that would perfectly model prior knowledge of
an expert: usually there is a level of sophistication one thinks experts may be capable of in terms of resolution in parameter
space. We removed degenerate cases by imposing an upper bound for the gradient of the priors. Thereby, we obtained more
informative results for GBR and also felt justiﬁed to utilize maximum likelihood methods. However, those major ‘‘ﬁltering
efforts” on the class of priors do not address the very fact that in applications, it will never be possible to perfectly model
an expert’s knowledge, even after ﬁltering. Along the lines of robust statistics one may then want to study posterior robust-
ness with respect to miniscule changes in the prior. In the present article, we suppress this additional layer of complexity in
order to distil the pure effects of changing updates rules.
Our new updating rule showed quite attractive behavior in the setting considered here: it is informative, more robust
against small changes in observations and less in conﬂict with monotonicity (posterior vs. observation) than maximum like-
lihood updating. A skeptic may argue that any updating rule which discounts precise priors in view of the evidence before
applying GBR would be logically inconsistent, as the evidence were used twice: ﬁrstly, the evidence is used to discount pri-
ors, secondly, those ranked priors are then updated with the evidence, and aggregated. This counter-argument would apply
to Gilboa’s and Schmeidler’s rule as well as for our new rule. A certainly desirable axiomatic analysis is beyond the scope of
this rather illustrative, yet conceptual paper. However, we observe that society very often behaves just like that on a ‘‘group-
of-experts-level”: it would listen more carefully to experts (i.e., precise priors) who have predicted the evidence with greater
skill. Hence we observe that there exist normative settings in society that operate just along lines very similar to that rule.
Furthermore, Gilboa’s and Schmeidler’s rule closely resembles a type II maximum likelihood prior, well-established within
robust Bayesian statistics [4, p. 99]. In any case we ﬁnd this type of using the evidence twice (which is not be confused with
falsely applying Bayes rule twice to the same data) more convincing than disregarding the statements of experts – that they
have no clue on correlations – and assuming an almost precise prior model for updating under GBR, as suggested in [34, Sec-
tion 3.3 and references therein].
Of course, more detailed studies are needed to evaluate the rule in a more comprehensive manner. For such future re-
search it will be important to investigate in particular (1) how the new updating rule will perform under the curse of dimen-
sion, i.e., for increasing number of parameters, (2) how robust its posteriors are with respect to miniscule changes in the
prior, (3) what posteriors it will produce when applied to a nonparametric, presumably convex class, and (4) how one could
transfer our innovations to complex dynamical models such as climate models.
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There is numerous analytic work on imprecise Gaussians – as examples we just mention [4,14]. However this Appendix
shall provide a self-contained set of equations that would allow the reader to verify the results in the main text
straightforwardly.
A.1. Parameterizing the class of priors
First we recall a well-known relationship on how to infer from joint on marginal properties (see e.g., [8, p. 283]):
Lemma 1. Let, for some p1; p2 2 N, the variable x ¼ x1x2
 
¼: ðxt1; xt2Þ with x1 2 Rp1 and x2 2 Rp2 distributed according to a
multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean l = (l1,l2)
t and covariance matrix R ¼ R11 R12
R21 R22
 
abbreviated as x  N(l,r) with
l1 2 Rp1 and R11 2 Rp1  Rp1 then a the marginal density of x1 is a (multivariate) Gaussian distribution with mean l1 and
covariance matrix R11, i.e., x1  N(l1,R11).
In the following we will use the compact notation (  j  ) for scalar products and (jMj  ) for quadratic forms w.r.t. a symmet-
ric matrix M, i.e., (jMjv) = vtMv.
Let P a two-dimensional Gaussian from our correlation class with the marginals P1  P2  N(l,r2). Then it can be ex-
pressed asPðxÞ ¼ ce12ðjR1 jðxxÞÞ; c ¼ 1
ð2pÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
detR
p ; ðA:1Þx denoting the mean, R the covariance matrix (see, e.g., [4]).
From Lemma 1, we immediately conclude ðl; lÞt ¼ x and R11 = R22 = r2. Furthermore we note that Rmust be symmetric as
a covariance matrix. Hence, it remains to show that f 2 [1,1].
In order to do so, we exploit the fact that a symmetric matrix R deﬁnes a Gaussian in Eq. (A.1) iff it is positive semi-def-
inite (as a covariance matrix must be), hence its two eigenvalues k1,2P 0. By deriving k1,2 = r  (1 ± jfj), we conclude
fR positive semi-definiteg () fjf j < 1g: ðA:2ÞA.2. Derivation of the posterior
A.2.1. Derivation of the bivariate posterior
Let hy :¼ 1=r2g (i.e., the ‘‘precision” of the likelihood), x :¼ ðx1; x2Þt ; x ¼ ðl; lÞt ; k :¼ ðj;1Þt . Then according to Bayes’ rule,
with sorting quadratic and linear terms in xPpostðx1; x2Þ / Nððl; lÞ;RÞðx1; x2Þ  Nðy;1=hyÞðjx1 þ x2Þ ðA:3Þ
/ e12Q 0 with ðA:4Þ
Q 0 :¼ ðjAjxÞ  2ðcjxÞ and ðA:5Þ
A :¼ R1 þ hyk kt ; ðA:6Þ
c :¼ R1xþ yhyk: ðA:7ÞSinceR ¼ r2 1 f
f 1
 
; it follows that ðA:8Þ
R1 ¼ C 1 ff 1
 
with C :¼ 1
r2ð1 f 2Þ : ðA:9ÞIn order to transform Q0 to standard form we transform the x-coordinates according toQ 0 ¼ ðjAjðx x0ÞÞ þ CÞ; ðA:10Þwhere x0 and C do not depend on x. We determine x0 by differentiating Eq. (A.10) w.r.t. x and obtainx0 ¼ A1c; hence ðA:11Þ
Ppostðx1; x2Þ ¼ NðA1c;A1Þðx1; x2Þ: ðA:12ÞA.2.2. Derivation of the posterior marginal in x1
From the bivariate posterior in Eq. (A.12) we easily obtain the marginal in x1 when we recall Lemma 1. Eq. (12) are then
obtained through Eq. (A.12) and the previous deﬁnitions by symbolic manipulation in MATHEMATICA 5.2.
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Recall that the prior density on the parameters x1, x2 is deﬁned byPðx1; x2Þ ¼ Nððl; lÞ;RÞðx1; x2Þ: ðA:13Þ
Let x :¼ ðx1; x2Þt; x ¼ ðl; lÞt; k :¼ ðj;1Þt. Set F: = (kjx) = jx1 + x2. Utilizing the following Lemma (see, e.g., [44, pp. 22,40])
Lemma 2. Let x,c denote n-dimensional vectors, P(x) a probability density function for x. Let y: = (cjx) for all x. Then
(1) mean(y) = (cjmean(x)),
(2) covar(y) = (jcovar(x)jc).
We then knowPFðFÞ ¼ NðlF ; r2F ÞðFÞ with ðA:14Þ
lF ¼ ðkjðl; lÞtÞ ¼ lð1þ jÞ; ðA:15Þ
rF ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðkjRjkÞ
q
ðA:16Þ
¼ r
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 2jf þ j2
p
: ðA:17ÞThen we recall that PðyjxÞ ¼ NðFðxÞ; r2gÞðyÞ, hencePy  NðlF ; r2yÞ with ry :¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r2F þ r2g
q
: ðA:18ÞFor subsection A.4 we will further need the following relation: by means of Eq. (A.17) we show readily thatinf
f2½1;1
ry ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðrðj 1ÞÞ2 þ r2g
q
¼: ry:min; ðA:19Þ
sup
f2½1;1
ry ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðrðjþ 1ÞÞ2 þ r2g
q
¼: ry:max: ðA:20ÞA.4. Derivation of the maximum likelihood priors
Py(y) <1 sets also the weight functionW(y) according to which we preselect priors for the maximum likelihood updating
rule: W  Py. Let ly,ry be the mean and standard deviation of the prior distribution for y. The present class of priors is con-
veniently parameterized by f which inﬂuences ry but not ly. By standard curve discussion we ﬁnd that for given y, W(f) is
maximized ifry:ML ¼ jy lyj ðA:21Þin case that equation has a solution for f 2 [1,1]. If we conclude from ry on f, we obtainfML ¼
1 for jy lyj < ry:min
þ1 for jy lyj > ry:max
ðylF Þ2r2g
2jðr21j2Þ otherwise
8><
>:
9>=
>;: ðA:22ÞA.5. Derivation of the weighting likelihood result
We note that the derivative W0(f) vanishes at the maximum once over [1,1]. namely for the term given in Eq. (A.22).
Hence, the equationW(f) =w, for given w, can have at most one solution left, and one right from fML. Either solution is found
numerically by specifying [1, fML] and [fML,1] as search intervals. Then we discretize the space for w between [0,W(fML)] and
apply Eq. (5).
A.6. Derivation of the maximum-derivative condition
Let a Gaussian probability density function P be given asPðxÞ ¼ ce12ðjR1 jxÞ; c ¼ 1
ð2pÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
detR
p ; ðA:23Þx being a two dimensional vector (see [4]).
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Let P be a bivariate Gaussian density function as deﬁned in Eq. (A.1).
From elementary manipulations one establishes (by ‘‘R2” denoting the square of the inverse of R)GðxÞ :¼ jgradPj2ðxÞ ¼ P2ðxÞðjR2jxÞ: ðA:24ÞThe maximum of the function G(x) will serve as criterion for whether P will be considered as a member of the prior class. In
order to determine the maximum of G, we establish the necessary condition for a local maximum:8if1;2g ooxi G ¼ 2P
o
oxi
PðxjR2jxÞ þ P22ðeijR2jxÞ ¼ 0; ðA:25Þwhere ei denotes the unit vectors of the coordinate system. Then we note that without loss of generality we can choose
the unit vectors identical with the normalized eigenvectors vi of R1 (to which may also belong the eigenvalues ki). We
conclude8if1;2g  kiðvijxÞðxjR2jxÞ þ k2i ðvijxÞ ¼ 0: ðA:26ÞCase 1. k1 6¼ k2:
Without loss of generality we assume k1 > k2.
Case 1.1. (v1jx) 6¼ 0:
Then we concludeðxjR2jxÞ ¼ k1: ðA:27ÞCase 1.1.1. (v2jx) 6¼ 0:
Then we concludeðxjR2jxÞ ¼ k2: ðA:28Þ
However, as k1 6¼ k2, the last two equations cannot be fulﬁlled simultaneously, hence, Case 1.1.1 can be ruled out.
Case 1.1.2. (v2jx) = 0:
In summary for Case 1 we can conclude that x must be parallel to one of the eigenvectors:9i2f1;2g x ¼ aivi with ai ¼ 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ki
p
; ðA:29Þhence, the local maxima of G are along the eigenvectors at the standard deviations. It is then easily veriﬁed that the global
maximum of G is along the larger eigenvector.
Case 2. k1 = k2:
The maximization problem can be reduced to a one-dimensional one due to rotational symmetry in x-space. By
identifying the radial coordinate with a1 of Case 1, one ﬁnds that Eq. (A.29) holds for Case 2 as well.A.6.2. Implementation of the gradient constraint
We now use the above information in order to preselect members of the class of priors according to their maximum norm
of the gradients of their densities.
As a reference, we use the maximum gradient of the marginals which in our example are both N(l,r2). Their maximum
gradient G* is readily derived asG ¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p  1
r2
: ðA:30ÞLet p the dimension of x (in our example p = 2). Then for p > 1, the gradient of P will have a different unit than that of one of
the marginals (in case x has a unit). Hence, a meaningful (in terms of units) restriction of the gradient reads asjgradPj  ðDxÞp1 < N  G; ðA:31Þwhere Dx denotes the typical scale per coordinate (in our example Dx = 1 = 4r), N the ‘‘expert’s resolution” (see Eq. (6)). The
factor (Dx)p1 can be interpreted as follows: ﬁrst, it adjusts units. Second, for a P whose density ﬁlls Dx in p  1 coordinates
while being denser in a single coordinate, the above expression in essence reveals the 1D gradient along the eigenvector v*
with the largest eigenvalue k* of R1. If P were higher concentrated in further dimensions as well, the left-hand side would
became larger. Hence, the above expression reveals the p-dimensional resolution, equivalent to N in Eq. (6).
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the maximum eigenvalue k* of R1. Let r0 :¼ 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k
p
. Then Pððl; lÞ þ avÞ ¼ c ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2pp r0Nð0; r02ÞðaÞ, hence the maximum modulus
of gradient of P reads c
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p
r0  1=ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2pep r02Þ. Combining this information with Eq. (A.31) leads to a test on r0, and, in turn on R
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